test.mysmartlogon.com - Healthcheck analysis

Date: 2019-07-26 - Engine version: 2.7.0.0 Beta

This report has been generated with the Basic Edition of PingCastle.
Being part of a commercial package is forbidden (selling the information contained in the report).
If you are an auditor, you MUST purchase an Auditor license to share the development effort.

Indicators

050100

Domain Risk Level: 100 / 100

It is the maximum score of the 4 indicators and one score cannot be higher than 100. The lower the better

050100

Stale Object : 80 /100

It is about operations related to user or computer objects

6 rules matched

050100

Trusts : 100 /100

It is about links between two Active Directories

5 rules matched

050100

Privileged Accounts : 100 /100

It is about administrators of the Active Directory

13 rules matched

050100

Anomalies : 100 /100

It is about specific security control points

15 rules matched

Stale ObjectsPrivileged accountsTrustsAnomalies
Inactive user or computer
Account take over
Old trust protocol
Backup
Network topography
ACL Check
SID Filtering
Certificate take over
Object configuration
Admin control
SIDHistory
Golden ticket
Obsolete OS
Irreversible change
Trust impermeability
Local group vulnerability
Old authentication protocols
Privilege control
Trust inactive
Network sniffing
Provisioning
Pass-the-credential
Replication
Password retrieval
Vulnerability management
Reconnaissance
Temporary admins
Weak password
Legend:
  score is 0 - no risk identified but some improvements detected
  score between 1 and 10 - a few actions have been identified
  score between 10 and 30 - rules should be looked with attention
  score higher than 30 - major risks identified
050100

Stale Objects : 80 /100

It is about operations related to user or computer objects

+ 15 Point(s)

Domain Controller Update

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that all the Domain Controllers are updated regularly. This is done by checking if a DC has been rebooted in the past 6 months. If not, it means it has not be patched as well in these 6 monthes

Technical explanation:

Domain Controller needs to be updated regularly because threats to the AD evolve all the time, so assets in the AD should evolve accordingly. The date of last update is computed by getting the StatisticsStartTime from [net statistics workstation]. If not available, the PingCastle solution will use the lastLogonTimestamp attribute which is refreshed based on the LastLogon attribute. Do note that there is a maximum delay for refresh: 14 days.

Advised solution:

Frequently updating the DC should be part of the AD policies, as there should be a dedicated time-slot for the servers to reboot and apply security patches

Points:

15 points if present

Documentation:

BSI M 4.315 Aufrechterhaltung der Betriebssicherheit von Active Directory

Details:

The detail can be found in Domain controllers

Domain controller ADIANT-A7B9AAC6 based on LastComputerLogonDate=11/9/2018 7:29:04 AM

+ 15 Point(s)

Check that every account requires a password

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that every account requires a password

Technical explanation:

An account can be set without a password if it has the flag "PASSWD_NOTREQD" set as "True" in the "useraccountcontrol" attribute. This represents a high security risk as the account is not protected at all without a password

Advised solution:

The best solution to solve the problem is to change the "useraccountcontrol" attribute of all the accounts that have it and that are not used in trusts. If the flag is removed while there is no password set, you will have an error. You can use this to detect accounts without any passwords. Do note that you can manually check all the accounts that need to be worked on using the following PowerShell command: get-adobject -ldapfilter "(&(objectCategory=person)(objectClass=user)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=32))" -properties useraccountcontrol

Points:

15 points if present

Documentation:

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/305144
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R36 [subsection.3.6]

Details:

The detail can be found in User information and Computer information

+ 15 Point(s)

SIDHistory check

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that a migration has been completed correctly and that the SIDHistory attribute has been cleared out from user and computer accounts. This attribute is indeed set when migrating a user or a computer from one domain to another

Technical explanation:

The SIDHistory attribute is useful when doing a migration because it allows to keep the reference to the former account. On the other hand, once the migration is over, it is mandatory that this attribute is removed to evaluate the permissions in regards with the new account and not the former one.

Advised solution:

To solve the security issue, you should remove all the SIDHistory attributes. To do so, you can list the objects having an SIDHistory attribute using the command: get-ADObject -ldapfilter "(sidhistory=*)" -properties sidhistory.
Each security descriptor of the domain (including file shares for example) should be reviewed to be rewritten with the new SID of the account. Then, the attribute can be removed of these accounts using the migration tool or a PowerShell snippet Remove-SIDHistory once the migration is completed. Please note that once the SID History has been removed, it cannot be added back again without doing a real migration. Hopefully hacking tools such as mimikatz can be used to undo a deletion with for example the lsadump::dcshadow attack.

Points:

5 points per discovery with a minimal of 15 points

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R15 [paragraph.3.3.1.5]

Details:

The SIDHistory detail can be found in User information and Computer information and a quick summary in SID History

S-1-5-18 [1 object(s)]

+ 15 Point(s)

Check for hidden group membership for computer accounts

Description:

The purpose is to check for unusual value in the primarygroupid attribute used to store group membership

Technical explanation:

In Active Directory, group membership is stored on the "members" attribute and on the "primarygroupid" attribute.
The default primary group value is "Domain Users" for the users, "Domain Computers" for the computers and "Domain Controllers" for the domain controllers.
The primarygroupid contains the RID (last digits of a SID) of the group targeted. It can be used to store hidden membership as this attribute is not often analyzed.
This rule can also be triggered if one domain controller is not in the default container (named "Domain Controllers" and located at the root) which is not a recommended practice.

Advised solution:

Unless strongly justified, change the primary group id to its default. 513 or 514 for users, 516 or 521 for domain controllers, 514 or 515 for computers. The primary group can be edited in a friendly manner by editing the account with the "Active Directory Users and Computers" and after selecting the "Member Of" tab, "set primary group".

Points:

15 points if present

Documentation:

https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/297951/how-to-use-the-primarygroupid-attribute-to-find-the-primary-group-for

Details:

The detail can be found in User information and Computer information

+ 10 Point(s)

Check the process of registration of computers to the domain

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that basic users cannot register extra computers in the domain

Technical explanation:

By default, a basic user can register up to 10 computers within the domain. This default configuration represents a security issue as basic users shouldn't be able to create such accounts and this task should be handled by administrators.

Advised solution:

To solve the issue limit the number of extra computers that can be registered by a basic user. It can be reduced by modifying the value of ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota to zero (0). Another solution can be to remove altogether the authenticated users group in the domain controllers policy. Do note that if you need to set delegation to an account so it can add computers to the domain, it can be done through 2 methods: Delegation in the OU or by assigning the SeMachineAccountPrivilege to a special group

Points:

10 points if present

Documentation:

http://support.microsoft.com/?id=243327
http://prajwaldesai.com/allow-domain-user-to-add-computer-to-domain/
http://blog.backslasher.net/preventing-users-from-adding-computers-to-a-domain.html

+ 10 Point(s)

DC Vulnerability (SMB v1)

Description:

The purpose is to verify if Domain Controller(s) are vulnerable to the SMB v1 vulnerability

Technical explanation:

The SMB downgrade attack is used to obtain credentials or executing commands on behalf of a user by using SMB v1 as protocol. Indeed, because SMB v1 supports old authentication protocol, the integrity can be bypassed

Advised solution:

It is highly recommended by Microsoft to disable SMB v1 whenever it is possible on both client and server side. Do note that if you are still not following best practices regarding the usage of deprecated OS (Windows 2000, 2003, XP, CE), regarding Network printer using SMBv1 scan2shares functionalities, or regarding software accessing Windows share with a custom implementation relying on SMB v1, you should consider fixing this issues before disabling SMB v1, as it will generates additional errors.

Points:

10 points if present

Documentation:

https://github.com/lgandx/Responder-Windows
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/josebda/2015/04/21/the-deprecation-of-smb1-you-should-be-planning-to-get-rid-of-this-old-smb-dialect
ttps://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/2696547/how-to-enable-and-disable-smbv1,-smbv2,-and-smbv3-in-windows-vista,-windows-server-2008,-windows-7,-windows-server-2008-r2,-windows-8,-and-windows-server-2012
ANSSI CERTFR-2016-ACT-039
ANSSI CERTFR-2017-ACT-019
BSI M 2.412 Schutz der Authentisierung beim Einsatz von Active Directory

Details:

The detail can be found in Domain controllers

Domain controller: WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E

050100

Privileged Accounts : 100 /100

It is about administrators of the Active Directory

+ 60 Point(s)

Ensure that dangerous privileges are not granted to everyone by GPO

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that standard users are not granted dangerous privileges

Technical explanation:

To perform special operations, the operating system relies on privileges. They can be displayed by running the command: whoami /all.
SeLoadDriverPrivilege can be used to take control of the system by loading a specifically designed driver. This procedure can be performed by low privileged users as the driver can be defined in HKCU.
SeTcbPrivilege is the privilege used to "Act on behalf the operating system". This is the privilege reserved to the SYSTEM user. This procedure allow any users to act as SYSTEM.
SeDebugPrivilege is the privilege used to debug program and to access any program's memory. It can be used to create a new process and set the parent process to a privileged one.
SeRestorePrivilege can be used to modify a service running as local system and startable by all users to a chosen one.
SeBackupPrivilege can be used to backup Windows registry and use third party tools for extracting local NTLM hashes.
SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege can be used to take ownership of any secureable object in the system including a service registry key. Then to change its ACL to define its own service running as LocalSystem.
SeCreateTokenPrivilege can be used to create a custom token with all privileges and thus be abused like SeTcbPrivilege
SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege can be abused to impersonate privileged tokens. These tokens can be retrieved by establishing security context such as Local DCOM DCE/RPC reflexion.

Advised solution:

Locate the GPO specified in Details and remove the privilege.
Most of the settings are located in :
Computer configuration -> Policies -> Windows Settings ->Security Settings -> Local Policies -> User Rights Assignment.
As an alternative, the file GptTmpl.inf can be manually edited.

Points:

15 points per discovery

Documentation:

https://www.romhack.io/slides/RomHack%202018%20-%20Andrea%20Pierini%20-%20whoami%20priv%20-%20show%20me%20your%20Windows%20privileges%20and%20I%20will%20lead%20you%20to%20SYSTEM.pdf
https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/
https://github.com/decoder-it/psgetsystem
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]

Details:

The detail can be found in Privileges

GPO: Default Domain Policy Account: Everyone Privilege: SeDebugPrivilege
GPO: Default Domain Policy Account: Everyone Privilege: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
GPO: test nfc 2 Account: Everyone Privilege: SeDebugPrivilege
GPO: test nfc 2 Account: Everyone Privilege: SeLoadDriverPrivilege

+ 45 Point(s)

Ensure that the privilege to log on Domain Controllers are not granted to everyone by GPO

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that standard users cannot login to Domain Controllers

Technical explanation:

Domain Controllers are critical components of the Active Directory. If an attacker is able to open a session, he will be able to discover unsecure backup media or perform a local privilege escalation to become the DC admin and thus the AD admin.
Local logon requires usually physical interaction, which explains why network seggregation is a best practice, but this can be bypassed. Indeed VNC or remote server management software is a way to perform local logon remotely.
In addition, remote server management software have been the subject of many vulnerabilites, some of them can be exploited even if this software is disabled.

Advised solution:

Locate the GPO specified in Details and remove the privilege "Allow log on locally" or "Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services" to "Everyone", "Authenticated Users", "Domain Users" or "Domain Computers".
The settings are located in :
Computer configuration -> Policies -> Windows Settings ->Security Settings -> Local Policies -> User Rights Assignment.
As an alternative, the file GptTmpl.inf can be manually edited.

Points:

15 points per discovery

Documentation:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-locally
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/allow-log-on-through-remote-desktop-services
https://support.hpe.com/hpsc/doc/public/display?docId=emr_na-c04197764-1
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]

Details:

The detail can be found in Privileges

GPO: Default Domain Controllers Policy Account: Everyone Privilege: SeInteractiveLogonRight on DC
GPO: Default Domain Controllers Policy Account: Authenticated Users Privilege: SeInteractiveLogonRight on DC
GPO: Default Domain Controllers Policy Account: Authenticated Users Privilege: SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight on DC

+ 30 Point(s)

Ensure that all login scripts cannot be modified by any user

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that standard users cannot modify login scripts

Technical explanation:

When the group Authenticated Users, Everyone or any similar groups have permission to modify a login script, it can be abused to take control of the accounts using this script. It can potentially lead to the compromise of the domain

Advised solution:

Edit the Access Control List (ACL) of the script object or the directory where the file is located. Then remove any write permission given to the group.

Points:

15 points per discovery

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]
STIG V-2370 - The access control permissions for the directory service site group policy must be configured to use the required access permissions.

Details:

The detail can be found in GPO Login script

Script: \\test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\test.ps1 Account: Authenticated Users Right: Modify, Synchronize
Script: test.ps1 Account: Authenticated Users Right: Modify, Synchronize

+ 30 Point(s)

Ensure that GPO items cannot be modified by any user

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that standard users cannot modify GPO

Technical explanation:

When the group Authenticated Users, Everyone or any similar groups have permission to modify a GPO, it can be abused to take control of the accounts where this GPO applies. It can potentially lead to the compromise of the domain

Advised solution:

Edit the Access Control List (ACL) of the GPO object or the directory where the items is located. Then remove any write permission given to the group.

Points:

15 points per discovery

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]
STIG V-2370 - The access control permissions for the directory service site group policy must be configured to use the required access permissions.

Details:

GPO: Default Domain Controllers Policy Item: \\WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E.test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\Policies\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}\GPT.INI Account: Authenticated Users Right: FullControl
GPO: Default Domain Controllers Policy Item: \\WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E.test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\Policies\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}\MACHINE\Registry.pol Account: Authenticated Users Right: FullControl

+ 20 Point(s)

At least one Administrator Account can be delegated

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that all Administrator Accounts have the configuration flag "this account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"

Technical explanation:

Without the flag "This account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" any account can be impersonated by some service account. It is a best practice to enforce this flag on administrators accounts.

Advised solution:

To correct the situation, you should make sure that all your Administrator Accounts has the check-box "This account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" active. Please not that there is a section bellow in this report named "Admin Groups" which give more information.

Points:

20 points if present

Documentation:

STIG V-36435 - Delegation of privileged accounts must be prohibited.

Details:

The detail can be found in Admin Groups

+ 15 Point(s)

Check delegations for the recipient's existence

Description:

The purpose is to verify that each delegation are linked to an account which exists

Technical explanation:

In the case where a delegation has been created where the account can't be translated to a NT account, it means that the delegation is actually from another domain or that the user has been deleted.

Advised solution:

To reduce the risk, the easiest way is essentially to remove the delegation

Points:

15 points if present

Documentation:

STIG V-2370 - The access control permissions for the directory service site group policy must be configured to use the required access permissions.

Details:

The detail can be found in Delegations

DN: CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com delegation: S-1-5-21-4005144719-3948538632-2546531719-1115 right: WRITE_PROP_MEMBER, VAL_WRITE_SELF_MEMBERSHIP, EXT_RIGHT_FORCE_CHANGE_PWD

+ 15 Point(s)

Ensure that file deployed by a GPO cannot be modified by everyone.

Description:

The purpose is to check that files deployed to computers cannot be changed by everyone.

Technical explanation:

Application provided in a msi form or general files can be deployed by a GPO. If an attacker can modify one of this file, it can take control of the user account.

Advised solution:

Locate the file mentionned by the GPO specified in Details and change its permissions.

Points:

5 points per discovery

Documentation:

STIG V-2370 - The access control permissions for the directory service site group policy must be configured to use the required access permissions.
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]

Details:

The detail can be found in GPO Deployed Files

GPO: WEF test Type: Files (User section) FileName: \\test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\test.txt Account: Authenticated Users Right: Modify, Synchronize
GPO: WEF test Type: Application (Computer section) FileName: \\test.mysmartlogon.com\SYSVOL\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\7z1900.msi Account: Authenticated Users Right: Modify, Synchronize
GPO: WEF test Type: Application (Computer section) FileName: \\test.mysmartlogon.com\SYSVOL\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\7z1900.msi Account: Authenticated Users Right: Modify, Synchronize

+ 15 Point(s)

A Delegation is granted to Everyone

Description:

The purpose is to verify that there is no delegation granted to "Everyone" and to "Authenticated Users"

Technical explanation:

To delegate control to a OU, access checks can be modified. In case of a misconfiguration, access can be granted to the group "Everyone" or "Authenticated Users".

Advised solution:

Review the delegation to remove this permission and if needed, set a more targeted group as recipient of the delegation.

Points:

15 points per discovery

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R18 [subsubsection.3.3.2]
STIG V-2370 - The access control permissions for the directory service site group policy must be configured to use the required access permissions.

Details:

The detail can be found in Delegations

DN: DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com delegation: Everyone right: GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop

+ 15 Point(s)

Ensure the "automatic administrative logon" feature of the recovery mode is not enabled

Description:

The purpose is to check that it is not possible to go into recovery mode without the administrator password

Technical explanation:

The recovery mode is a special mode allowing an admin to fix an issue preventing the computer to boot. By pressing F8 in the short time span allowed, the computer boots with just a simple command line.
Usually, the administrator password is requested to avoid that people having physical access get control of it. It can typically be done by creating a new user account and add this account as member of the administrators group. This rule checks if there are any GPO which disable this password prompt.

Advised solution:

Locate the GPO specified in Details and turn off the setting "Recovery console: Allow automatic administrative logon"
The setting is located in :
Computer configuration -> Policies -> Windows Settings ->Security Settings -> Local Policies -> Security Options.
As an alternative, the file GptTmpl.inf can be manually edited.

Points:

15 points if present

Documentation:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/recovery-console-allow-automatic-administrative-logon
STIG V-1159 - The Recovery Console option is set to permit automatic logon to the system.

Details:

The detail can be found in Security settings

GPO: Default Domain Policy

+ 15 Point(s)

Check if admin accounts are vulnerable to the kerberoast attack.

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that the password of admin accounts cannot be retrieved using the kerberoast attack.

Technical explanation:

To access a service using kerberos, a user does request a ticket (named TGS) to the DC specific to the service.
However this ticket is encrypted using a derivative of the service password. This ticket can then be brute-forced to retrieve the original password.
Any account having the attribute SPN populated is considered as a service account.
Given the fact that any user can request a ticket for service account, these accounts can have their password retrieved.
In addition, services are known to have their password not changed at a regular basis and to use well-known words.

Please note that this program skips service accounts having their password changed for less than 40 days ago to allow a mitigation using a password change process.

Advised solution:

If the account is a service account, the service should be removed from the privileged group or have a process to change it at a regular basis.
If the user is a person, the SPN attribute of the account should be removed.

Points:

5 points per discovery

Documentation:

https://adsecurity.org/?p=3466

Details:

The detail can be found in Admin Groups

Group: Administrators User: Adiant
Group: Domain Admins User: Adiant
Group: Schema Admins User: Adiant

+ 10 Point(s)

Avoid unexpected schema modifications which could result in domain rebuild

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that no account can make unexpected modifications to the schema

Technical explanation:

The group "Schema Admins" is used to give permissions to alter the schema. Once a modification is performed on the schema such as new objects, it cannot be undone. This can result in a rebuild of the domain. The best practice is to have this group empty and to add an administrator when a schema update is required then to remove this group membership.

Advised solution:

Remove the accounts or groups belonging to the "schema administrators" group.

Points:

10 points if present

Documentation:

STIG V-72835 - Membership to the Schema Admins group must be limited
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R13 [subsection.3.2]

Details:

The detail can be found in Admin Groups

+ 10 Point(s)

At least one Domain controller is not owned correctly

Description:

The purpose is to perform a review of which accounts have ownership rights on a domain controller and can then modify their permissions

Technical explanation:

By default, the "Domain Administrators" group or the "Enterprise Administrators" group are set as owners for "Domain Controllers". Nonetheless, in some cases (for instance when the server has been promoted from an existing server), the owner can be a non-admin person which joined the server to the domain. If this person has still rights over this account, it can be used to take ownership over the whole domain. A chain of compromising events can be designed to take control of the domain by including this account.

Advised solution:

To solve this security issue, you should change the ownership of the domain controller to match the "Domain Administrators" group.
To control the ownership of domain controller objects, you can use the following PowerShell command:
Get-ADComputer -server my.domain.to.check -LDAPFilter "(&(objectCategory=computer)(|(primarygroupid=521)(primarygroupid=516)))" -properties name, ntsecuritydescriptor | select name,{$_.ntsecuritydescriptor.Owner}.
To change it you can edit the owner of an object using adexplorer.exe. First, locate the DC object then right click to select properties. Open the security tab and press the advanced button. You then have a new dialog with an owner tab. Select the owner and change it for the domain administrators group. You’re done (no reboot needed)

Points:

10 points if present

Details:

The detail can be found in Domain controllers

Domain controller: CN=ADIANT-A7B9AAC6,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com Owner: TEST\administrator

Informative rule

Check that operators group are empty

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that the operator groups, which can have indirect control to the domain, are empty

Technical explanation:

Operator groups (account operators, server operators, ...) can take indirect control of the domain. Indeed these groups have write access to critical resources of the domain.

Advised solution:

It is recommended to have these groups empty. Assign administrators into administrators group. Other accounts should have proper delegation rights in an OU or in the scope they are managing.

Points:

Informative rule (0 point)

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R27 [subsection.3.5]

Details:

The detail can be found in Admin Groups

Group: Account Operators Member counts: 1

050100

Trusts : 100 /100

It is about operations related to user or computer objects

+ 50 Point(s)

Check for Trusts whose security is not maximum

Description:

The purpose is to check if all trusts are protected using the functionality named SID Filtering

Technical explanation:

SID Filtering is a mechanism used to block account presenting a SID History property. SID History is used to link an existing account to another account and can be use to propagate a compromise through trusts. SID Filtering for domain to domain trust is called a quarantine and is disabled by default. SID Filtering to a forest is enabled by default and disabling it is called "enabling SID History".

The algorithm to compute the SID Filtering is:
get the attribute trustDirection and TrustAttributes of the trust object.
if the direction is 0 or 1 or if the trust is intra forest (trustattributes & 32 != 0) then SID Filtering is not applicable.
Then, if the trust is a forest trust (trusattributes & 8 != 0) then
check if /enablesidhistory has been enabled - trustattributes & 64 != 0.
If enabled: SID Filtering is deactivated.
Else if not a forest trust (trustattributes & 8 == 0) then check for the quarantined attribute (trustattributes & 4 != 0).
If the quarantine flag is set, SID Filtering is enabled.

You can use the PowerShell command to get its status:
[System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain().GetSidFilteringStatus('my.domain.to.test.local')

Advised solution:

A trust without SID Filtering means either that a migration is in progress or that the domain can be compromised instantly via the trust.
The solution is to complete existing migration ASAP and enable the SID Filtering feature

If the trust is a domain trust, you should use netdom /quarantine and set it to yes
If the trust is a forest trust, you should use netdom /enablesidhistory and set it to no
Do not apply /quarantine on a forest trust: you will break the transitivity of the trust.

Points:

100 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 4
then 80 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 2
then 50 points if present

Documentation:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc237940.aspx
BSI M 4.314 Sichere Richtlinieneinstellungen für Domänen und Domänen-Controller
STIG V-8538 - Security identifiers (SIDs) must be configured to use only authentication data of directly trusted external or forest trust.
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R16 [paragraph.3.3.1.6]

Details:

The detail can be found in Trusts section

trust without SID Filtering: mil

+ 50 Point(s)

Check for local backdoor stored in SID History

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that accounts are not linked for more privileged accounts in the same domain

Technical explanation:

SID History is an attribute used in migration to link with a former account. It is not possible to have an account linked with an account belonging to the same domain. This can be analyzed by comparing the domain part of the SID History with the domain SID.

Advised solution:

It is not possible to have this occurrence except if a user from domain A has been migrated to domain B and then migrated again to domain A. This should be strongly investigated as it may be linked to a compromise of the domain.

Points:

50 points if present

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R15 [paragraph.3.3.1.5]

+ 20 Point(s)

Check for inactive trusts

Description:

The purpose is to verify that every trust has a remote domain which is active.

Technical explanation:

When a trust is active, it is using a shared secret to communicate to a domain. This secret is hold in a special account whose name is the remote domain name. This password is changed every month and as consequence the whenChanged attribute of this account is changed. When there is no modification of the whenChanged attribute, it can be guessed that the secret has not being changed and that there was either a problem with the remote domain or that the remote domain does not exist anymore.

Advised solution:

Check for network connectivity issues from the remote domain or if the remote domain still exists. If it doesn't exist anymore, the trust should be removed. Indeed the secret used by the trust can be used to issue fake kerberos tickets and be used as a backdoor.

Points:

20 points if present

Documentation:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/fr-fr/library/ms680921(v=vs.85).aspx

Details:

The detail can be found in Trusts section

mil
test4.mysmartlogon.com

+ 10 Point(s)

Check if kerberos delegation can be used to take control of the forest from a trusted forest

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that a forest cannot be used to compromise another forest using kerberos delegation

Technical explanation:

A Forest trust is a link between two forests. By default, this trust is secure and prohibits SID History attacks.
However, it allows kerberos delegation by default.
By configuring an uncontrainst delegation on forest A, an attacker located in forest A can collect admin or domain controller credentials, the TGT of the session, of the forest B.
This collection can be forced by using services such as the printer spooler, enabled by default on all domain controllers.
Having collected this TGT, the attacker can then request access to other systems in forest B, by asking for a TGS given the TGT, and then gain control of the whole forest.

Advised solution:

TGT Delegation on forest trusts should be disabled, except for migrations.
You can use netdom to turn the TGT delegation on forest trust OFF.
Example: netdom.exe trust fabrikam.com /domain:contoso.com /EnableTGTDelegation:No
As an alternative, you can locate the forest trust and change its LDAP trustattribute from the value 8 to the value 520.

The impact is to have non working services which relies on unconstrained delegation. Resource based delegation is not impacted.

See the official Microsoft recommandations and a script to find potentially impacted services in the links below.

Points:

10 points per discovery

Documentation:

http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/not-a-security-boundary-breaking-forest-trusts/
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Premier-Field-Engineering/Changes-to-Ticket-Granting-Ticket-TGT-Delegation-Across-Trusts/ba-p/440283/tab/rich
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4490425/updates-to-tgt-delegation-across-incoming-trusts-in-windows-server

Details:

The detail can be found in Trusts section

Forest trust misconfigured: test4.mysmartlogon.com

+ 5 Point(s)

Check if a migration is in progress

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that the SID History creation is not enabled

Technical explanation:

To migrate accounts to another domain, the attribute SID History should be added to the new account. Despite the fact that numerous hacking tools such as mimikatz allows the creation of the SID History attribute, its official creation requires the presence of a special auditing group named DOMAIN-$$$ such as TEST-$$$ for the TEST domain.

Advised solution:

If a migration is in progress, declare it in PingCastle so this rule won't be triggered. Else, remove this auditing group. You can locate it by using the LDAP query (sAMAccountNmae=*$$$)

Points:

5 points if present

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R15 [paragraph.3.3.1.5]

050100

Anomalies : 100 /100

It is about specific security control points

+ 60 Point(s)

Find Password GPO

Description:

The purpose is to alert when a clear text password has been identified in the GPO. Regardless of whether the password is present or not, both the account and password should be considered compromised

Technical explanation:

A check is performed to identify passwords in the GPO. If a password is identified through the PingCastle solution, it means that it can be identified through many other means by attackers, and that the account should be considered compromised.
Do note that the AES key used to encrypt passwords in GPOs has been made public for interoperability reasons, which is why even an encrypted password is compromised. It has been revealed in this page

Advised solution:

In order to solve this issue, you should manually change the password to a new one. If this password is shared on many systems, each system should have a different password. If the GPO was used to define the native local administrator account, it is recommended to install a password solution manager such as the LAPS solution.

Points:

20 points per discovery

Documentation:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc422924.aspx
ANSSI CERTFR-2015-ACT-046

Details:

The detail can be found in the Obfuscated Passwords

GPO: test nfc 2 login: administrator password: vletoux
GPO: test nfc 2 login: adiant password: vletoux
GPO: test nfc 2 login: test password: test

+ 30 Point(s)

Check for Accounts using Smart Card with unchanged password for a long time

Description:

The purpose is to make sure the requirement of Smart Cards doesn't degrade password rotation

Technical explanation:

Using Smart Card to protected sensitive account is a good thing. Nevertheless, when the "Smart Card required" flag is set, the password of the account is not changed anymore by default. Internally the hash of this password is used to sign the user's kerberos tickets, making this account vulnerable to Silver ticket attacks. The rule is triggered 90 days after the last change of the attribute unicodePwd. This value is collected using the replication metadata of the attribute 589914

Advised solution:

There are 3 solutions to fix this issue, the most obvious being to change the user password on a regular basis. The fastest way is to check if the domain has the attribute msDS-ExpirePasswordsOnSmartCardOnlyAccounts, which is available for Windows 2016 and later versions and handle periodically hash change. Another possibility instead of changing the password is to disable the flag "this account requires a smart card" then re-enable it which will trigger internally a password hash change.

Points:

30 points if present

Documentation:

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/positivesecurity/2017/05/17/smartcard-and-pass-the-hash/
STIG V-72821 - All accounts, privileged and unprivileged, that require smart cards must have the underlying NT hash rotated at least every 60 days.
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R38 [paragraph.3.6.2.2]

Details:

The detail can be found in Smart Card and Password

+ 20 Point(s)

Mitigate golden ticket attack via a regular change of the krbtgt password

Description:

The purpose is to alert when the password for the krbtgt account can be used to compromise the whole domain. This password can be used to sign every kerberos ticket. Monitoring it closely often mitigates the risk of golden ticket attacks greatly.

Technical explanation:

Kerberos is an authentication protocol. It is using to sign its tickets a secret stored as the password of the krbtgt account. If the hash of the password of the krbtgt account is retrieved, it can be use to generate authentication tickets at will.
To mitigate this attack, it is recommended to change the krbtgt password every 40 days. If it not the case, every backup done until the last password change of the krbtgt account can be used to emit Golden tickets, compromising the entire domain.
Retrieval of this secret is one of the highest priority in an attack, as this password is rarely changed and offer a long term backdoor.
Also this attack can be performed using the former password of the krbtgt account. That's why the krbtgt password should be changed twice to invalidate its leak.

Advised solution:

The password of the krbtgt account should be changed twice to invalidate the golden ticket attack.
Beware: two changes of the krbtgt password not replicated to domain controllers can break these domain controllers You should wait at least 8 hours between each krbtgt password change.

There are several possibilities to change the krbtgt password.
First, a Microsoft script can be run in order to guarantee the correct replication of these secrets. Unfortunately this script supports only English operating systems.
Second, a more manual way is to essentially reset the password manually once, then to wait 3 days, then to reset it again. This is the safest way as it ensures the password is no longer usable by the Golden ticket attack.

Points:

50 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 732
then 40 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 366
then 30 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 180
then 20 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 70

Documentation:

https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Reset-the-krbtgt-account-581a9e51
ANSSI CERTFR-2014-ACT-032

Details:

The detail can be found in Krbtgt

+ 15 Point(s)

Check for the last backup date according to Microsoft standard

Description:

The purpose is check if the backups are actually up to date in case they are needed. The alert can be triggered when a domain is backed up using non-recommended methods

Technical explanation:

A verification is done on the backups, ensuring that the backup is performed according to Microsoft standards. Indeed at each backup the DIT Database Partition Backup Signature is updated.  If for any reasons, backups are needed to perform a rollback (rebuild a domain) or to track past changes, the backups will actually be up to date. This check is equivalent to a REPADMIN /showbackup *.

Advised solution:

Plan AD backups based on Microsoft standards. These standards depend on the Operating System. For example with the wbadmin utility: wbadmin start systemstatebackup -backuptarget:d:

Points:

15 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 7

Documentation:

https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/jj130668(v=ws.10).aspx
STIG V-25385 - Active Directory data must be backed up daily for systems with a Risk Management Framework categorization for Availability of moderate or high. Systems with a categorization of low must be backed up weekly.

Details:

The detail can be found in Backup

+ 15 Point(s)

Check for suspicious account(s) used in administrator activities

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that there is no rogue admin accounts in the Active Directory

Technical explanation:

A check is performed on non-admin accounts in order to identify if they have an attribute admincount set. If they have this attribute, it means that this account, which is not supposed to be admin, has been granted administrator rights in the past. This typically happens when an administrator gives temporary rights to a normal account, off process.

Advised solution:

These accounts should be reviewed, especially in regards with their past activities and have the admincount attribute removed. In order to identify which accounts are detected by this rule, we advise to run a PowerShell command that will show you all users having this flag set: get-adobject -ldapfilter "(admincount=1)"
Do not forget to look at the section AdminSDHolder below.

Points:

50 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 50
then 45 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 45
then 40 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 40
then 35 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 35
then 30 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 30
then 25 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 25
then 20 points if the occurence is greater or equals than 20
then 15 points if present

Documentation:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms675212(v=vs.85).aspx
ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R40 [paragraph.3.6.3.1]

Details:

The detail can be found in the AdminSDHolder User List

+ 10 Point(s)

Retrieve data from the domain without any account

Description:

The purpose is to access without any account, aka NULL Sessions, within the Active Directory. A NULL Session is a session opened anonymously to access the AD, often used by attackers to perform a recon operation on the AD, to identify weaknesses

Technical explanation:

Unless other rules which check for known cause of anonymous access, this rule tries to enumerate accounts from the domain without any account. The program use two methods: MS-SAMR with a NULL connection and MS-LSAT which forces SID resolution with well known SID.
NULL sessions are deactivated by default since Windows 2003 and Windows XP. For compatibility reasons a setting enabling them may be still active years after.
It is possible to verify the results provided by the PingCastle solution by using a Kali distribution. You should run [rpcclient -U " target_ip_address] and press enter at the password prompt to finally type [enumdomusers].

Advised solution:

Locate other PingCastle rules such as A-PreWin2000Anonymous or A-DsHeuristicsAnonymous which triggered and apply the solutions. You can use the PingCastle scanner mode to do a manual check and prove the extraction of the data.

Points:

10 points if present

Documentation:

https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/windows/null-sessions-nt-2000-286
BSI M 2.412 Schutz der Authentisierung beim Einsatz von Active Directory
STIG V-14798 - Directory data (outside the root DSE) of a non-public directory must be configured to prevent anonymous access.

Details:

The detail can be found in Domain controllers and Null Session

DC involved: WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E

+ 10 Point(s)

Check for Short password length in password policy

Description:

The purpose is to verify if the password policy of the domain enforces users to have at least 8 characters in their password

Technical explanation:

A check is performed to identify if the GPO regarding password policy allows less than 8 characters password. Short passwords represents a high risk because they can fairly easily be brute-forced. Most CERT and agencies advises for at least 8 characters (and often this number goes up to 12)

Advised solution:

To solve the issue, the best way is to either remove the GPO enabling short password, or to modify it in order to increase the password length to at least 8 characters

Points:

10 points if present

Documentation:

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/password-guidance/
BSI M 4.314 Sichere Richtlinieneinstellungen für Domänen und Domänen-Controller

Details:

The detail can be found in Password policies

Found in GPO Default Domain Controllers Policy
Found in GPO Default Domain Policy
Found in GPO test nfc 2
Found in GPO PSO:test

+ 5 Point(s)

Ensure LDAP signing requirements is not set to None

Description:

The purpose is to check that the integrity of the network protocol LDAP as not been explicitly disabled.

Technical explanation:

The LDAP signature feature enables the integrity of the network communication between the computer and the domain controller.
Hackers aim at intercepting the communication at the network layer and modify the network dialog to grant themselves admin privileges.
The goal of this feature is to defeat these attacks.
Unfortunately, not all devices support LDAP signature. That's why the best practice is to Require Signature if possible or to, at least, try to negotiate it.
In this case, the LDAP signature feature is configured to None (no negotiation), which can enable hackers to perform their attacks.

Advised solution:

Locate the GPO specified in Details and change the setting in "Network security: LDAP client signing requirements".
Disable this setting, or set it to "Negotiate signing" or "Require Signature".
The setting is located in :
Computer configuration -> Policies -> Windows Settings ->Security Settings -> Local Policies -> Security Options.
As an alternative, the file GptTmpl.inf can be manually edited.

Points:

5 points if present

Documentation:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/network-security-ldap-client-signing-requirements
STIG V-3381 - The Recovery Console option is set to permit automatic logon to the system.
BSI M 2.412 Schutz der Authentisierung beim Einsatz von Active Directory
ANSSI CERTFR-2015-ACT-021

Details:

The detail can be found in Security settings

GPO: Default Domain Policy

+ 5 Point(s)

Check for Windows 2000 compatibility which allows access to the domain without any account

Description:

The purpose is to identify domains which allow access without any account because of a Pre-Windows 2000 compatibility.

Technical explanation:

When a Windows 2003 DC is promoted, a pre-Windows 2000 compatibility setting can be enabled through the wizard. If it is enabled, the wizard will add "Everyone" and "Anonymous" to the pre-Windows 2000 compatible access group, and by doing so, it will authorize the domain to be queried without an account (null session)
It is possible to verify the results provided by the PingCastle solution by using a Kali distribution. You should run [rpcclient -U " target_ip_address] and press enter at the password prompt to finally type [enumdomusers].

Advised solution:

Remove the "EveryOne" and "Anonymous" from the PreWin2000 group while making sure that the group "Authenticated Users" is present. Then reboot each DC

Points:

5 points if present

Documentation:

https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc223672.aspx
BSI M 2.412 Schutz der Authentisierung beim Einsatz von Active Directory
STIG V-8547 - The Anonymous Logon and Everyone groups must not be members of the Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access group.

+ 5 Point(s)

Check for GPO enabling the unsafe algorithm LM hash

Description:

The authentication protocol NTLM v1 can use the LM password hash algorithm which is weak if enabled by a GPO.

Technical explanation:

LM hash, or LAN Manager hash is a hash algorithm developed by Microsoft since Windows 3.1. Due to flaw design, hashes retrieved from the network can be reverted to the clear text password in a matter of seconds.

Advised solution:

A GPO explicitly disabled the default security policy LmCompatibilityLevel or NoLMHash. Using the information provided, identify the setting modified in the GPO and fix it.
All security settings should be modified in the Domain GPO Editor and are located in Computer Configuration / Policies / Windows Settings / Security Settings / Local Policies / Security Options
For NoLMHash the setting is located in: Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change
For LmCompatibilityLevel the setting is located in: Network security: LAN Manager authentication level

Points:

5 points if present

Documentation:

ANSSI - Recommandations de sécurité relatives à Active Directory - R37 [paragraph.3.6.2.1]
STIG V-3379 - The system is configured to store the LAN Manager hash of the password in the SAM.
BSI M 2.412 Schutz der Authentisierung beim Einsatz von Active Directory

Details:

The detail can be found in Security settings

Found in GPO Default Domain Policy with setting NoLMHash

+ 1 Point(s)

Check for Intermediate Certificates using unsafe hashing algorithm (SHA1)

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that there is no use of the SHA1 hashing algorithm in Intermediate Certificate

Technical explanation:

The SHA1 hashing algorithm is not considered as safe. There are design flaws inherent to the algorithm that allow an attacker to generate a hash collision in less than a brute-force time

Advised solution:

To solve the matter, the certificate should be removed from the GPO and if needed, certificates depending on it should be reissued.

Points:

1 points if present

Documentation:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6194
STIG V-14820 - PKI certificates (server and clients) must be issued by the DoD PKI or an approved External Certificate Authority (ECA).

Details:

The detail can be found in Certificates

Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is SERIALNUMBER=200804, CN=Foreigner CA, C=BE
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=COMODO Code Signing CA, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB

Informative rule

Check the Password Policy for Service Accounts (Information)

Description:

The purpose is to give information regarding a best practice for the Service Account password policy. Indeed, having a 20+ characters password for this account greatly helps reducing the risk behind Kerberoast attack (offline crack of the TGS tickets)

Technical explanation:

The rule is purely informative, as it gives insights regarding a best practice. It verifies if there is a GPO or PSO enforcing a 20+ characters password for the Service Account.

Advised solution:

The recommended way to handle service accounts is to use "Managed service accounts" introduced since Windows 2008 R2 (search for "msDS-ManagedServiceAccount").
To solve the anomaly, you should implement a PSO or GPO password guarantying a 20+ length password.

Points:

Informative rule (0 point)

Documentation:

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/password-guidance/

Details:

The detail can be found in Password Policies

Informative rule

Check for presence of the Protected users group

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that the schema has been updated for the creation of Protected Users group.

Technical explanation:

The Protected Users group is a special group which is a very effective mitigation solution to counter attacks using Credential theft starting with Windows 8.1. Older Operating System must be updated to take this protection in account such as the Windows 7 KB2871997 patch.

Advised solution:

The Protected Users group is automatically created when a Windows 2012 R2 domain controller is installed and upgraded to a PDC (primary DC). The group is then be automatically created and replicated.
Warning: Do not add service account into this group as this will result in "authentication failure" messages. Use "protected accounts" instead

Points:

Informative rule (0 point)

Documentation:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group
STIG V-78131 - Accounts with domain level administrative privileges must be members of the Protected Users group in domains with a domain functional level of Windows 2012 R2 or higher.
ANSSI CERTFR-2017-ALE-012

Details:

The schema version is indicated in Domain Information

Informative rule

Check for Root Certificates using unsafe hashing algorithm (SHA1)

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that there is no use of the SHA1 hashing algorithm in Root Certificate

Technical explanation:

The SHA1 hashing algorithm is not considered as safe. There are design flaws inherent to the algorithm that allow an attacker to generate a hash collision in less than a brute-force time

Advised solution:

To solve the matter, the certificate should be removed from the GPO and if needed, certificates depending on it should be reissued.

Points:

Informative rule (0 point)

Documentation:

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6194
STIG V-14820 - PKI certificates (server and clients) must be issued by the DoD PKI or an approved External Certificate Authority (ECA).

Details:

The detail can be found in Certificates

Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com
Found in GPO GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Subject is CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE
Found in GPO NTLMStore Subject is CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com

Informative rule

Check if LLMNR can be used to steal credentials

Description:

The purpose is to ensure that local name resolution protocol (LLMNR) cannot be used to collect credentials by performing a network attack

Technical explanation:

LLMNR is a protocol which translates names such as foo.bar.com into an ip address. LLMNR has been designed to translate name locally in case the default protocol DNS is not available.
Regarding Active Directory, DNS is mandatory which makes LLMNR useless.
LLMNR exploits typo mistakes or faster response time to redirect users to a specially designed share, server or website.
Being trusted, this service will trigger the single sign on procedure which can be abused to retrieve the user credentials.

LLMNR is enabled by default on all OS except starting from Windows 10 v1903 and Windows Server v1903 where it is disabled.

Advised solution:

Enable the GPO Turn off multicast name resolution and check that no GPO override this setting.
(if it is the case, the policy involved will be displayed below)

Points:

Informative rule (0 point)

Documentation:

https://youtu.be/Fg2gvk0qgjM

Details:

The detail can be found in Security settings

GPO overriding the setting: Default Domain Policy

Domain Netbios Name Domain Functional Level Forest Functional Level Creation date DC count Schema version Recycle Bin enabled
test.mysmartlogon.com TEST Windows Server 2008 R2 Windows Server 2008 R2 2012-03-03 18:12:40Z 2 Windows Server 2008 R2 TRUE

Account analysis

Nb User Accounts Nb Enabled ?Nb Disabled ?Nb Active ?Nb Inactive ?Nb Locked ?Nb pwd never Expire ?Nb SidHistory ?Nb Bad PrimaryGroup ?Nb Password not Req. ?Nb Des enabled. ?Nb unconstrained delegations ?Nb Reversible password ?
2319451406301000
[14]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
123456789 2017-11-15 13:47:44Z Never CN=tata yoyo.123456789,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
ADHealthCheck$ 2016-12-03 10:22:26Z Never CN=ADHealthCheck,CN=Managed Service Accounts,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
BlueHat 2018-01-19 15:23:37Z Never CN=BlueHat,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
HINSON 2014-11-30 16:02:50Z Never CN=Kimberly Hinson,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
min 2014-06-21 21:19:29Z 2014-07-03 21:24:07Z CN=min,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount1 2015-06-26 10:20:33Z Never CN=wrongAccount1,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount10 2018-08-20 14:22:43Z Never CN=wrongaccount10,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount2 2015-06-26 10:20:48Z Never CN=wrongAccount2,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount3 2015-06-26 11:13:15Z Never CN=wrongaccount3,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount5 2015-06-26 15:47:18Z Never CN=wrongAccount5,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount6 2015-06-26 15:47:35Z Never CN=wrongAccount6,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount7 2015-06-27 07:26:05Z 2015-06-27 09:27:23Z CN=wrongAccount7,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount8 2016-03-28 10:40:52Z Never CN=wrongaccount8,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount9 2016-03-30 13:02:35Z Never CN=wrongaccount9,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[6]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
Administrator 2012-03-03 18:13:00Z 2019-05-08 11:55:09Z CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
HINSON 2014-11-30 16:02:50Z Never CN=Kimberly Hinson,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
min 2014-06-21 21:19:29Z 2014-07-03 21:24:07Z CN=min,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
test 2013-03-31 11:33:16Z 2019-07-15 11:52:36Z CN=test,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
test2 2019-03-23 07:19:15Z 2019-03-23 08:19:23Z CN=test2,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
testitb1 2019-04-06 11:31:38Z 2019-04-06 13:33:30Z CN=testitb,CN=Builtin,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[3]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
BlueHat 2018-01-19 15:23:37Z Never CN=BlueHat,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
test 2013-03-31 11:33:16Z 2019-07-15 11:52:36Z CN=test,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount8 2016-03-28 10:40:52Z Never CN=wrongaccount8,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[1]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
BlueHat 2018-01-19 15:23:37Z Never CN=BlueHat,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com

SID History

SID History from domain First date seen ? Last date seen ? Count
S-1-5-182013-03-31 11:33:16Z2013-03-31 11:33:16Z1
test.mysmartlogon.com2016-03-28 10:40:52Z2018-01-19 15:23:37Z2

Account analysis

Nb Computer Accounts Nb Enabled ?Nb Disabled ?Nb Active ?Nb Inactive ?Nb SidHistory ?Nb Bad PrimaryGroup ?Nb unconstrained delegations ?Nb Reversible password ?
9 9 0 6 30110
[3]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
ADIANT-2CC70D66$ 2013-04-01 09:32:22Z 2013-04-01 11:32:26Z CN=ADIANT-2CC70D66,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
ADIANT-A7B9AAC6$ 2013-04-01 10:10:33Z 2018-11-09 07:29:04Z CN=ADIANT-A7B9AAC6,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
WINDOWS7X86$ 2012-03-03 22:07:05Z 2016-09-15 23:54:27Z CN=WINDOWS7X86,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[2]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
ADIANT-VIRTUAL-$ 2019-01-27 12:57:02Z 2019-01-27 13:57:02Z CN=ADIANT-VIRTUAL-,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
TEST$ 2019-01-27 09:40:38Z 2019-01-27 10:40:41Z CN=TEST,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[1]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
ADIANT-A7B9AAC6$ 2013-04-01 10:10:33Z 2018-11-09 07:29:04Z CN=ADIANT-A7B9AAC6,CN=Computers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
[1]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E$ 2012-03-03 18:17:15Z 2019-07-17 17:14:16Z CN=WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com

Operating Systems

Operating System Nb OS Nb Enabled ?Nb Disabled ?Nb Active ?Nb Inactive ?Nb SidHistory ?Nb Bad PrimaryGroup ?Nb unconstrained delegations ?Nb Reversible password ?
Windows XP 2 2 0 0 20100
Windows 7 3 3 0 2 10000
Windows 10 1 1 0 1 00000
Windows 2008 1 1 0 1 00010
OperatingSystem not set 1 1 0 1 00000
Ubuntu Desktop Linux 1 1 0 1 00000

Domain controllers

Here is a specific zoom related to the Active Directory servers: the domain controllers.

[2]
Domain controller Operating System Creation Date ? Startup Time Uptime Owner ? Null sessions ? SMB v1 ? Remote spooler ?FSMO role ?
WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E Windows 2008 2012-03-03 18:17:15Z 2019-05-06 19:45:09Z 80 days TEST\Domain Admins YES YES NOPDC,
RID pool manager,
Infrastructure master,
Schema master,
Domain naming Master
ADIANT-A7B9AAC6 Windows XP 2013-04-01 10:10:33Z Inactive? TEST\administrator NO NO NO

Groups

This section is focused on the groups which are critical for admin activities. If the report has been saved which the full details, each group can be zoomed with its members. If it is not the case, for privacy reasons, only general statictics are available.

Group Name Nb Admins ? Nb Enabled ? Nb Disabled ? Nb Inactive ? Nb PWd never expire ? Nb Smart Card required ?Nb Service accounts ? Nb can be delegated ? Nb external users ?
Account Operators 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Administrators 5 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
Backup Operators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cert Publishers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Crypto Operators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dns Admins 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Domain Admins 5 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
Enterprise Admins 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Network Operators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Print Operators 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0
Schema Admins 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Server Operators 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
[8]
SamAccountName ? Enabled ? Active ? Pwd never Expired ? Locked ? Smart Card required ?Service account ?Flag Cannot be delegated present ? Distinguished name ?
Adiant NO NO NO YES NO CN=Adiant,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
Administrator YES NO NO NO YES CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
test2 YES NO NO NO NO CN=test2,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
teste ( NO NO NO NO YES CN=New Object with (dsg,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
testitb1 YES NO NO NO NO CN=testitb,CN=Builtin,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount1 NO NO NO NO NO CN=wrongAccount1,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount5 NO NO YES NO NO CN=wrongAccount5,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount8 NO NO NO NO NO CN=wrongaccount8,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com

Delegations

Each specific rights defined for Organizational Unit (OU) are listed below.

[12]
DistinguishedName Account Right
DC=test Everyone GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop
DC=test TEST\Domain Controllers EXT_RIGHT_REPLICATION_GET_CHANGES_ALL
CN=MicrosoftDNS,CN=System NT AUTHORITY\ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop
CN=MicrosoftDNS,CN=System TEST\DnsAdmins GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop
CN=RAS and IAS Servers Access Check,CN=System TEST\RAS and IAS Servers GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop
CN=WMIPolicy,CN=System TEST\Group Policy Creator Owners GenericWrite, DSSelf, Write all prop
CN=SOM,CN=WMIPolicy,CN=System TEST\Group Policy Creator Owners GenericWrite, DSSelf, Write all prop
CN=Users S-1-5-21-4005144719-3948538632-2546531719-1115 WRITE_PROP_MEMBER, VAL_WRITE_SELF_MEMBERSHIP, EXT_RIGHT_FORCE_CHANGE_PWD
OU=TestOU TEST\Adiant GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, All extended right, DSSelf, Write all prop
OU=TestOU TEST\wrongAccount6 GenericAll, GenericWrite, WriteDacl, WriteOwner, WRITE_PROP_MEMBER, VAL_WRITE_SELF_MEMBERSHIP
OU=TestOU TEST\wrongAccount7 EXT_RIGHT_FORCE_CHANGE_PWD
OU=TestOU TEST\wrongaccount9 EXT_RIGHT_FORCE_CHANGE_PWD

Discovered Domains

Trust Partner Type Attribut Direction ? SID Filtering active ? TGT Delegation ? Creation ? Is Active ? ?
mil ? MIT Non-Transitive Outbound No Not applicable 2014-06-09 12:49:20Z False
test4.mysmartlogon.com ? Uplevel Forest Trust Inbound Not applicable Yes 2019-04-06 21:53:36Z False

Reachable Domains

These are the domains that PingCastle was able to detect but which is not releated to direct trusts. It may be children of a forest or bastions.

Reachable domain Via Netbios Creation date

Backup

The program checks the last date of the AD backup. This date is computed using the replication metadata of the attribute dsaSignature (reference).

Last backup date: Never

LAPS

LAPS is used to have a unique local administrator password on all workstations / servers of the domain. Then this password is changed at a fixed interval. The risk is when a local administrator hash is retrieved and used on other workstation in a pass-the-hash attack.

Mitigation: having a process when a new workstation is created or install LAPS and apply it through a GPO

LAPS installation date: 2019-03-22 21:12:37Z

Windows Event Forwarding (WEF)

Windows Event Forwarding is a native mechanism used to collect logs on all workstations / servers of the domain. Microsoft recommends to Use Windows Event Forwarding to help with intrusion detection Here is the list of servers configured for WEF found in GPO

Number of WEF servers configured: 3

[3]
GPO Name Order Server
WEF test 1 Server=http://192.168.0.25:5985/wsman/SubscriptionManager/WEC
WEF test 2 test
WEF test 3 teset2

krbtgt (Used for Golden ticket attacks)

The password of the krbtgt account should be changed twice every 40 days using this script

You can use the version gathered using replication metadata from two reports to guess the frequency of the password change or if the two consecutive resets has been done. Version starts at 1.

Kerberos password last changed: 2019-03-10 18:21:24Z version: 3

AdminSDHolder (detect temporary elevated accounts)

This control detects accounts which are former 'unofficial' admins. Indeed when an account belongs to a privileged group, the attribute admincount is set. If the attribute is set without being an official member, this is suspicious. To suppress this warning, the attribute admincount of these accounts should be removed after review.

Number of accounts to review: 1

[1]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
wrongaccount9 2016-03-30 13:02:35Z Never CN=wrongaccount9,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com

NULL SESSION (anonymous access)

This control detects domain controllers which can be accessed without authentication. Hackers can then perform a reconnaissance of the environement with only a network connectivity and no account at all.

Domain controllers vulnerable: 1

[1]
Domain Controller
WIN-PGAHI2ECI8E

Smart Card and Password

This control detects users which use only smart card and whose password hash has not been changed for at least 40 days. Indeed, once the smart card required check is activated in the user account properties, a random password hash is set. But this hash is not changed anymore like for users having a password whose change is controlled by password policies. As a consequence, a capture of the hash using a memory attack tool can lead to a compromission of this account unlimited in time. The best practice is to reset these passwords on a regular basis or to uncheck and check again the "require smart card" property to force a hash change.

Users with smart card and having their password unchanged since at least 40 days: 3

[3]
Name Creation Last logon Distinguished name
BlueHat 2018-01-19 15:23:37Z Never CN=BlueHat,CN=Users,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongaccount10 2018-08-20 14:22:43Z Never CN=wrongaccount10,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com
wrongAccount5 2015-06-26 15:47:18Z Never CN=wrongAccount5,OU=TestOU,DC=test,DC=mysmartlogon,DC=com

Logon scripts

You can check here backdoors or typo error in the scriptPath attribute

Script Name Count
None 19

Certificates

This detects trusted certificate which can be used in man in the middle attacks or which can issue smart card logon certificates

Number of trusted certificates: 17

[17]
Source Store Subject Issuer NotBefore NotAfter Module size Signature Alg SC Logon
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Root CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE 2000-05-30 12:48:38Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Root CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE 2007-10-04 12:00:00Z 2021-12-15 09:00:00Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Root CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE 2014-02-13 15:30:41Z 2019-01-16 15:30:41Z 3072 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Root CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com 2015-10-03 09:34:06Z 2030-10-02 09:44:04Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine Root CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI 2014-05-01 09:08:21Z 2041-09-15 09:08:21Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine CA SERIALNUMBER=200804, CN=Foreigner CA, C=BE CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE 2007-10-04 14:00:00Z 2014-06-04 14:00:00Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine CA CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE 2005-06-07 10:09:10Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
GPO:Default Domain Policy;Machine CA CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US 2011-08-24 02:00:00Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com 2015-10-03 09:34:06Z 2030-10-02 09:44:04Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE CN=MaskTech CSCA, OU=Test Division, O=MaskTech GmbH, C=DE 2014-02-13 15:30:41Z 2019-01-16 15:30:41Z 3072 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE CN=Belgium Root CA2, C=BE 2007-10-04 12:00:00Z 2021-12-15 09:00:00Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US 2011-08-24 02:00:00Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI CN=DOD EMAIL CA-29, C=US, O=U.S. Government, OU=DoD, OU=PKI 2014-05-01 09:08:21Z 2041-09-15 09:08:21Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE 2000-05-30 12:48:38Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US CN=AddTrust External CA Root, OU=AddTrust External TTP Network, O=AddTrust AB, C=SE 2005-06-07 10:09:10Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=COMODO Code Signing CA, O=COMODO CA Limited, L=Salford, S=Greater Manchester, C=GB CN=UTN-USERFirst-Object, OU=http://www.usertrust.com, O=The USERTRUST Network, L=Salt Lake City, S=UT, C=US 2011-04-27 02:00:00Z 2020-05-30 12:48:38Z 2048 sha1RSA False
Enterprise NTAuth ? NTLMStore CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com CN=CA, DC=test, DC=mysmartlogon, DC=com 2012-03-03 19:21:37Z 2027-03-03 19:31:35Z 2048 sha1RSA False

Password policies

Note: PSO (Password Settings Objects) will be visible only if the user which collected the information has the permission to view it.
PSO shown in the report will be prefixed by "PSO:"

Policy Name Complexity Max Password Age Min Password Age Min Password Length Password History Reversible Encryption Lockout Threshold Lockout Duration Reset account counter locker after
Default Domain Controllers Policy False Never expires 0 day 0 Not Set Not Set Not Set Not Set Not Set
Default Domain Policy False Never expires 0 day 0 0 False 0 Not Set Not Set
test nfc 2 False Never expires 0 day 1 Not Set Not Set Not Set Not Set Not Set
PSO:test False 90 day(s) 0 day 0 5 False 50 5 minute(s) 1 minute(s)

Screensaver policies

This is the settings related to screensavers stored in Group Policies. Each non compliant setting is written in red.

Policy Name Screensaver enforced Password request Start after (seconds) Grace Period (seconds)
test nfc 2 True True 90000 Not Set

GPO

Obfuscated Passwords

The password in GPO are obfuscated, not encrypted. Consider any passwords listed here as compromissed and change it immediatly.

GPO Name Password origin UserName Password Changed Other
test nfc 2 groups.xml administrator vletoux 2016-04-02 19:40:14Z NewName:adiant-admin
test nfc 2 drives.xml adiant vletoux 2016-04-02 19:39:33Z Path:test
test nfc 2 groups.xml test test 2016-04-02 20:21:02Z

Restricted Groups

Giving local group membership in a GPO is a way to become administrator.
The local admin of a domain controller can become domain administrator instantly.

Security settings

A GPO can be used to deploy security settings to workstations.
The best practice out of the default security baseline in reported in green.
The following settings in red are unsual and may need to be reviewed.
Each setting is accompagnied which its value and a link to the GPO explanation.

Policy Name Setting Value
Default Domain Controllers Policy Allow anonymous SID/Name translation (Technical details) Enabled
Default Domain Controllers Policy Microsoft network server: Digitally sign communications (if client agrees) (Technical details) Disabled
Default Domain Policy Recovery console: Allow automatic administrative logon Enabled
Default Domain Policy LDAP client signing requirements (Technical details) None (Do not request signature)
Default Domain Policy Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change (Technical details) Disabled
Default Domain Policy Turn off multicast name resolution (Technical details) LLMNR Enabled

Privileges

Giving privileges in a GPO is a way to become administrator without being part of a group.
For example, SeTcbPriviledge give the right to act as SYSTEM, which has more privileges than the administrator account.

GPO Name Privilege Members
Default Domain Policy SeDebugPrivilege Everyone
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege IIS APPPOOL\crl.eid.belgium.be
Default Domain Policy SeLoadDriverPrivilege Everyone
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege IIS APPPOOL\SmartPolicy
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege IIS APPPOOL\DefaultAppPool
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege IIS APPPOOL\Classic .NET AppPool
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeInteractiveLogonRight on DC Everyone
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeInteractiveLogonRight on DC Authenticated Users
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeMachineAccountPrivilege Authenticated Users
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeMachineAccountPrivilege Authenticated Users
Default Domain Controllers Policy SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight on DC Authenticated Users
test nfc 2 SeDebugPrivilege adiant-test
test nfc 2 SeDebugPrivilege Everyone
test nfc 2 SeLoadDriverPrivilege Everyone

GPO Login script

A GPO login script is a way to force the execution of data on behalf of users.

GPO Name Action Source Command line Parameters
Default Domain Controllers Policy Logon Registry.pol (Computer section) \\test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\test.ps1
test nfc 2 Logon scripts.ini (User section) test.vbs machin trust
test nfc 2 Logoff scripts.ini (User section) test123
test nfc 2 Logoff scripts.ini (User section) tatayoyo
test nfc 2 Logon psscripts.ini (User section) test.ps1 tsettte
test nfc 2 Logoff psscripts.ini (User section) test456

GPO Deployed Files

A GPO can be used to deploy applications or copy files. These files may be controlled by a third party to control the execution of local programs.

GPO Name Type File
WEF test Files (User section) \\test.mysmartlogon.com\sysvol\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\test.txt
WEF test Application (Computer section) \\test.mysmartlogon.com\SYSVOL\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\7z1900.msi
WEF test Application (Computer section) \\test.mysmartlogon.com\SYSVOL\test.mysmartlogon.com\bin\7z1900.msi